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APPELLEE'S BRIEF
I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH

CODE ANN.

II.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Did the district court err in finding that the six-year statute of limitations on a

claim for breach of a written employment contract ran from the time of the breach, when
written notice of termination was delivered, and not from the date that the termination
became effective?
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions of law are accorded no
particular deference and the appellate court reviews such conclusions for
correctness. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); Harline v.
Baker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994).
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES OR RULES
UTAH CODE. ANN.

§ 78-12-23 is determinative and central to the issue on appeal.

That section states:

1

An action may be brought within six years: . ..
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22 [judgment or decree of
any court of the United States or of any state or territory within the United
States].
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Procedural and Factual Background

On December 23, 2003, Stephen Clarke filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah against Living Scriptures. [Record ("R.") 1-17.] The
Complaint asserted claims for breach of employment contract, unjust enrichment,
detrimental reliance, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, lost business opportunity,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and punitive damages. [R.
1-17.] In response, Living Scriptures filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the action on the grounds that it did not
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [R. 20-31.] The basis of Living
Scripture's motion was that each of Clarke's claims was barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. [Record 23-31.] In his Opposition Brief, Clarke conceded that most of his
claims were barred, but argued that his breach of contract claims were timely. [Record
53-62.] Clarke also argued that, despite his concession that his tort claims were barred,
his separate claim for punitive damages should not be dismissed. [R. 53-62, at pp. 60.]
2

After argument on the motion, the trial court granted Living Scripture's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint by Order dated April 12, 2004 ("Order of Dismissal"). [R. 76-78.]
Clarke filed this appeal, seeking reversal of the trial court's Order of Dismissal. Because
the breach of contract claim accrued more than six years before Clarke filed his
Complaint, the Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss and this appeal, all of the allegations
contained in the Complaint are deemed true. See, e.g., Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, f 2,
40 P.3d 1128, 1130-31 (Utah 2002); Clark v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 34 P.3d 209, 210
(Utah 2001). Clarke alleges that he began working for Living Scriptures as a college
student in 1989 and continued with the company thereafter. On April 7, 1997, he entered
into a written contract with Living Scriptures in which he was classified as an
independent contractor. [R. 1-17, at f 20.] Subsequently, in August of 1997, Clarke was
hired as the Provo Division Manager, but continued to operate under the existing written
contract. [Id. & f 24.] Clarke claims that his new management duties resulted in a
reduction of time dedicated to selling Living Scriptures' product and thereby reduced his
sales commission income. [R. 17, at f 16.] He also claims to have received oral
assurances of a future with the company. [Id. at f 26.]

3

On December 9, 1997, a letter ("Notice of Termination") was hand-delivered to
Clarke which stated:
This letter is your written notice that we are terminating the Independent
Salesman Agreement that we have with you effective 15 days from the above
date. Please prepare and submit to us a list of all pending, unfinished business
involving sales of the Company products. This action is taken as per section 10 of
the Independent Salesman Agreement you signed on April 7, 1997.
[R. 1-17, at Tf 28 (emphasis added).]1 The Independent Salesman Agreement
("Agreement") had a one-year term which would be automatically renewed unless
terminated by either party. Paragraph 10 of that Agreement gave Living Scriptures the
right to terminate Clarke "upon the Salesman's failure to abide by the terms hereof or
upon his failure to meet the minimum sales requirement, which is $3,000 of merchandise
per month." [R. 1-17, at ^f 20.]2 Clarke claims that he was "either excused from his sales
responsibility or prevented from undertaking any sales," and that his sales averaged over
$3,000 per month. [R. 1-17, at ^f 35-36.] Although Clarke makes factual allegations in his
appeal brief relating to his activity after the Notice of Termination was delivered, there is
no evidence in the record or any allegation in the Complaint that supports those

Although Clarke indicated that a copy of the Notice of Termination was attached as an
exhibit to the Complaint, it was not attached and is not part of the record on appeal.
2

The Agreement also provided for fifteen days notice of termination. [R. at p. 7, % 34.]
4

allegation. See, Appellant's Brief, at p. 7, f 10. Clarke makes reference in his
Opposition below to an affidavit concerning these activities, but no affidavit was ever
filed with the trial court and there is no affidavit in the record on appeal. [Compare, R.
54, with R. 1-85.]
Accepting each of the allegations in the Complaint as true, Clarke's breach of
contract claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations and the Motion to Dismiss
was properly granted.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

A Contract Claim Accrues at the Time of the Breach.

In Utah, an action for breach of a written contract must be brought within six years
of the time the cause of action accrued. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues
at the time of the breach, whether or not damages are immediately realized. Here, the
breach, if any, occurred on December 9, 1997 when Living Scriptures delivered written
notice to Clarke terminating his employment. The written Notice of Termination
unconditionally stated that Clarke was fired from his position. He had all the information
he needed at that moment to pursue a legal action against Living Scriptures and the
statute of limitations began to run.

5

B.

Clarke Did Not File His Complaint Within Six Years of the Breach.

The Notice of Termination was delivered to Clarke on December 9, 1997, giving
him until December 9, 2003 to bring his breach of contract claim. The Complaint was not
filed until December 23, 2003 and is therefore barred.
VI.

ARGUMENT
The sole issue before this Court is when the statute of limitations began to run on

Clarke's breach of contract claim against Living Scriptures. Living Scriptures maintains
that the action is barred because the claim accrued and the statute began to run on the date
the written Notice of Termination was delivered, December 9,1997. Because termination
was "effective 15 days from" the date of the written Notice of Termination, Clarke claims
that he had until December 24, 2003 to file the Complaint. The determination of when the
cause of action accrued is essential to the resolution of this dispute.
A.

A Claim For Breach of Contract Accrues at the Time of the Breach.

The Utah legislature has indicated that the limitations periods established for
various causes of action begin to run at the time the claim accrues.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a different
limitation is prescribed by statute.

6

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-1 (emphasis added). In Utah, a claim for breach of contract

accrues for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations at the time of the breach,
whether or not damages are immediately incurred. E.g., S &G, Inc. v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 740 (Utah 1996); Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,
313 (Utah CtApp. 1987).
That distinction was recognized by this Court in S & G, where the plaintiff sought
recovery against Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA") on a series of theories, including
breach of contract. S &G agreed to sell all of the water appurtenant to land in Delta,
Utah to IP A for municipal culinary purposes. The purchase price was to be determined
by a set dollar amount per acre foot. The contract also provided that if the state engineer,
or the Utah courts on review of the engineer's decision, failed to quantify the amount of
water sold, the parties would presume 912 acre feet for purposes of calculating the
amount due to S & G. 913 P.2d at 737. On September 10, 1984, the state engineer set the
quantity at 775.2 acre feet. S &G believed that quantity was too low and requested that
IP A file an action challenging the engineer's decision. IP A refused and S & G attempted
to bring the action on its own behalf. Eventually, S &G was found to be without
standing to challenge the engineer's decision. On July 3, 1992, IPA paid S & G for the
7

775.2 acre feet set by the engineer and waived all claims against IPA, except those arising
from its failure to file suit challenging the engineer's quantity assessment. On March 27,
1992, S &G filed a complaint claiming that IP A breached the contract between the
parties by failing to seek judicial review of the state engineer's decision. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of IP A on the grounds that S &G's action was barred
by the statute of limitations and S &G appealed.
S & G claimed that its breach of contract cause of action did not accrue for
purposes of triggering the statute of limitations until after its appeal of the state engineer's
decision was concluded unsuccessfully. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
"a contract action ordinarily accrues at the time of the breach." 913 P.2d at 740 (quoting
Upland Industries, 684 P.2d at 643; Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d
1182, 1186 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). This Court concluded that the breach occurred in
1984 when IP A failed to file the appeal and expressly rejected S & G's argument that the
limitations period did not commence until after S&G's unsuccessful appeal when
damages could be ascertained.
S &G's present appeal admittedly presents a rare circumstance where S &G's
asserted damages may not have been entirely measurable until several years after
the purported breach. Nevertheless, S &G should have been aware that an
unfavorable ruling in Morgan [the case S & G brought to appeal the engineer's
decision] would provide the very damages it now claims.
8

913 P.2d at 741 n.6. Thus, the S & G Court held that the action for breach of contract
was barred because it was not brought within six years of the breach.
As in S & G, Clarke's breach of contract claim accrued for purposes of the statute
of limitations at the time of the breach. That event occurred, if at all, when the Notice of
Termination was delivered to Clarke. At that moment, he understood that his
employment was terminated. [R. at 1-17, at f 66.] To the extent the termination was not
appropriate under his Agreement, it was apparent at that moment and he could have
immediately initiated legal proceedings. This is true even if the damages were not fully
ascertainable at that time.
B.

Most Courts Hold that the Claim Accrues at the Time Notice of
Termination is Communicated to the Employee. Even if Employment or
Benefits Continue Beyond that Date.

The majority of courts that have considered this issue under facts similar to those
present here have found that a cause of action accrues for breach of an employment
contract at the time notice of termination is given, even if the effective date of the
termination is later. See e.g., Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 952 F.2d 128, 134 (5th
Cir. 1992) (limitations period commences when the employee receives unequivocal notice
of his termination); Eisenberg v. Insurance Company of North America, 815 F.2d 1285,
1292 (9th Cir. 1987) (limitations period commences upon notice of termination even if
9

employment continues past that date); Walch v. University of Montana, 861 P.2d 179,
182-83 (Mont. 1993) (limitations period commences from notice of discharge even if
employment continues beyond that date); Callender v. Suffolk County, 783 N.E.2d 470,
473 (Mass. Ct. App. 2003) (limitations period commenced at time employee notified of
discontinuation of benefits); Stephenson v. American Dental Assoc, 789 A.2d 1248, 1252
(D.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("The fact that his last day of work was to be sixty days after notice
of termination does not negate the injury unquestionably experienced at the moment of
notice."); City of East Point v. Seagraves, 524 S.E.2d 755, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(limitations period commences at time of breach even if damages not yet incurred); Luna
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Texas Ct. App. 1987) (discharge occurred and
action accrued when employee informed company could not use him anymore);
Montalban v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 11A F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Puerto Rico
1991) (limitations period commences upon notice); Riggs v. Boeing Company, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (D. Kan. 1998) (action accrued at time of notice of termination);
Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 814 F. Supp. 1101,1102 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("It is well
established that in cases which challenge employment termination decision, the applicable
limitations period begins to run when notice of termination was given and not on the date
when employment actually terminated."); Chapman v. HOMCO, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 787,
10

790 (N.D. Texas 1988) ("In a case alleging an unlawful discharge, the statute of
limitations commences when the employee is notified that his employment is to be
terminated.").
The United States Supreme Court considered this issue in Delaware State College
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). On June 26, 1974, the College informed Ricks that he had
been denied tenure, but offered him a contract to teach one additional year. On
September 9, 1977, after the completion of the one-year teaching contract, Ricks filed a
complaint against Delaware State College, claiming that he was denied tenure on the
basis of his race and national origin. The trial court granted the College's motion to
dismiss the complaint as untimely because it had not been filed within 180 days "after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" as required by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the
limitations period did not begin to run until the one-year teaching contract expired on
June 30, 1975. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit
and reinstated the trial court's order of dismissal, stating "Mere continuity of
employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for
employment discrimination." 449 U.S. at 257. The Delaware State College Court held
that the only alleged discrimination occurred at the time the tenure decision was
11

communicated to Ricks even though the effects of that denial were not felt until later.
449 U.S. at 258. See also, Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (limitations
period ran from notice of termination not from last date of employment).
The same analysis is applicable to the claims asserted by Clarke. The Notice of
Termination was unequivocal. And, as is reflected in the Complaint, Clarke understood
that he was terminated as of that moment.
[I]n spite of all of plaintiff s work, time, energy, enthusiasm and efforts toward
improving the performance and profitability of defendant, on December 9,1997,
without warning, hint or as much as an admonition, defendant abruptly and
illegally terminated plaintiffs employment.
[R. 1-17, at 1f 66.]
Indeed, Clarke claims that after "he was given the notice of termination, [he was]
instructed to clean out his desk and marched out the front door of the business." [R. 54, at
f 5.]3 At that time, Clarke was "rather unceremoniously informed that Living [Scriptures]
no longer desired to associate with him." Id. At that moment, Clarke knew without
doubt that he had been fired. If it was a breach of the Agreement to terminate Clarke, that

3

Although this admission appears in Clarke's Opposition Brief below and not in the
Complaint, the trial court should be permitted to rely upon it. "An admission of fact in a
pleading is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." Baldwin v.
Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984) (citing, Yates v. Large, 585 P.2d 697, 699-700
(Or. 1981); Paul Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Construction, Inc., 630 P.2d 27, 28 (Ariz. 1981)).
12

breach occurred and the cause of action for breach of contract accrued on December 9,
1997 when Living Scriptures terminated Clarke's employment. See, e.g., Naton v. Bank
of California, 649 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1980) (where unequivocal notice of termination
and the last day of work coincide, the statute of limitations begins to run on that date even
if benefits continue for some period of time); Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569
F.2d 187, 191 (3rd Cir. 1977) (same). By Clarke's own admission, he was given the
Notice of Termination, told to clean out his desk, and marched out the door on December
9, 1997. [See, Opposition Brief, R. 53-62, at p. 2, \ 5.]
Furthermore, the fact that some of the cases relied upon by Living Scriptures arise
in the context of federal employment laws does not dilute their persuasiveness in a breach
of contract action. While the federal analysis is concentrated on when the discriminatory
act occurred, the breach of contract inquiry is focused on the time of the breach. In both
instances, there is an act that is alleged to be contrary to the employer's legal obligation-a
breach of law or of contract. When that event occurs, the limitations period commences.
Thus, the federal analysis is consistent with that applied in a breach of contract context.
Here, Clarke identified December 9, 1997 as the specific date upon which he was
fired. [R. 17, at f 66.] His claim is that it was a breach of the written employment
agreement to terminate his employment. Thus, because Clarke knew on December 9,
13

1997 that he had been let go, he also knew that according to his interpretation of the
Agreement, it had been breached. Clarke waited over six years from that date to file this
action and his claims are barred.
C.

The Utah Cases Cited By Clarke Are Not Contrary to A Finding that the
Claim for Breach of Contract Accrued at the Time Notice Was
Communicated to Clarke.

The Utah cases cited by Clarke do not mandate a different result. For example,
Clarke's reliance on DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996), is
misplaced. There, this Court held that each of the claims asserted by a group of plaintiffs
that had lost money on deposit with failed thrift institutions sounded in tort, not contract.
The trial court found that plaintiffs' breach of contract and breach of warranty
claims were "simply rephrased negligence claims," and thus "they too are subject
to a four year limitations period." We agree.
926 P.2d at 842 n. 13. With respect to the tort claims, the DOIT Court held that the
limitations period had been tolled by the Thrift Settlement Financing Act adopted by the
Utah legislature. Consequently, it was not necessary to determine when the tort claims
actually accrued. 926 P.2d at 842.
The accrual issue was addressed, however, in a later section of the opinion which
dealt with plaintiffs' state securities claims. The DOIT plaintiffs argued that the
limitations period did not commence "until it became apparent that they would not
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receive the return of their deposits" on March 12, 1987 when the State abandoned the
attempt to rehabilitate the thrifts and instead began liquidation efforts. 926 P.2d at 842.
This Court rejected that argument, holding that the securities claims arose when the
accountant's allegedly false and misleading audit reports were issued. Because the latest
of these reports was delivered July 31, 1986, the DOIT Court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of Touche Ross on the grounds that the statute of limitations
had expired. That result does not suggest a delay of the running of the statute of
limitations in this case.
The analysis in DOIT focused first on the nature of the cause of action at issue.
Then, based on whether the claim sounded in tort, contract, or was created by statute, the
Court determined when that particular claim accrued and the limitations period
commenced. Clarke's only remaining claims here are for breach of contract. He admits
that his tort claims are barred. [R. at 59.] A tort claim accrues at the time of the happening
of the last element necessary to bring a claim, including damages. See, e.g., Retherford
v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992); Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.
v. Bonneville Investments, Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). A breach of contract claim,
however, accrues at the time of the breach and can be brought even when damages are
uncertain. See, e.g., S&G, 913 P.2d at 741 n.6. Indeed, the damages recoverable for a
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breach of contract action may be no more than nominal and still support the claim. See,
e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, \ 18, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001);
Fashion Place Associates v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 1988); Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Service, 930 P.2d 280, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In Bair, this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs breach of
contract action, holding that even if the liquidated damages provision of the subject
contract was unenforceable, the contract claim would still lie:
[I]t is well settled that "nominal damages are recoverable upon breach of
contract if no actual or substantial damages resulted from the breach or if the
amount of damages has not been proven." Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt,,
Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1982) (citing, Gould v. Mountain States Tel & Tel
Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 193, 309 P.2d 802, 805 (1957); Thompson v. Andersen, 107
Utah 331, 336, 153 P.2d 665, 667 (1944); 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 9 (1965)).
20 P.3d at 392-93 (emphasis added). This is true because the gravamen of a breach of
contract claim is the breach itself. Thus, even if Clarke's damages could not be precisely
identified at the time he received the Notice of Termination, he had a fully-accrued cause
of action for breach of contract on December 9, 1997 when Living Scriptures allegedly
"abruptly and illegally terminated plaintiffs employment." [R. 1-17, at % 66.]
Furthermore, the damages alleged in the Complaint were all known to Clarke on
December 9, 1997 when he received the Notice of Termination. Clarke claims $95,000
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per year for six years in lost sales commissions, $150,000 for the use of his "ideas,
concepts and plans" allegedly communicated to Living Scriptures prior to December 9,
1997, $22,463.61 for renovation costs of his home office, a VCR for the Ogden Mall
location, and for recruiting efforts all incurred before December 9, 1997, $250,000 for
serving him with the December 9, 1997 Notice of Termination in bad faith, and $40,000
for the sales opportunities he allegedly lost by accepting a management position. [R. 117, at Tffl 40, 51, 58, 67, 85.] Each of these alleged damages was as identifiable on
December 9, 1997 as they were when Clarke filed his Complaint over six years later.
Contrary to his assertions that "any claim for breach of contract was not ripe,"
Appellant's Brief, at p. 10, Clarke could have initiated a lawsuit against Living Scriptures
immediately upon receipt of the Notice of Termination. His decision not to do so for over
six years after he was marched out of Living Scriptures' offices is fatal to his breach of
contract claim and the Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.
Likewise, this Court's decision in Davidson Lumber has no application here. See,
Appellant's Brief, at p. 10. Bonneville designed a beam that it sold to Davidson Lumber.
The beam was eventually installed in a building leased to Thrifty Corporation and
operated as a drugstore. On October 20, 1978, the roof of the building collapsed, causing
significant damage to Thrifty. On May 21, 1979, Thrifty sued a number of defendants in
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California, including Davidson. While that action was pending, Davidson initiated a
lawsuit in Utah because it could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Bonneville in the
California action. Thereafter, Davidson settled the claims asserted by Thrifty for $45,000
and sought to recover that amount from Bonneville in the Utah lawsuit. Bonneville
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Davidson's claim was barred by the
statute of limitations provided by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") because it was
brought more than seven years after Davidson purchased the beam from Bonneville. The
trial court denied summary judgment and the Utah Supreme Court entertained an
interlocutory appeal. Because Thrifty was not a purchaser of the beam, but merely the
tenant of a building in which the beam had been installed, this Court held that the action
was not governed by the UCC. The Davidson Court found that "the damages it [Thrifty]
sought were not for breach of contract or breach of a U.C.C. warranty, but for the
commission of a tort." 794 P.2d at 13. Concluding that "[a] tort cause of action accrues
when it becomes remediable in the courts, that is, when all elements of a cause of action
come into being," this Court held that the limitations period did not commence until the
payment of the $45,000 by Davidson to settle the California lawsuit. 794 P.2d at 19
(emphasis added). The Court also found that Davidson's claim to recover the $45,000
paid to settle that California action was a common-law indemnity claim that sounded in
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implied contract. Because "[a] common law indemnity claim does not arise when the
underlying damage occurs; rather it runs from the time of the payment of the underlying
claim or payment of a judgment or settlement," the Davidson Court held that the action
was timely. Id. (citations omitted).
There is nothing about the Davidson decision that would delay the commencement
of the limitations period in this case. Clarke admits that all of his tort claims were barred
years before he filed this action. Furthermore, there is no claim here for common law
indemnity. The claims at issue sound in contract and accrued at the time of breach on
December 9, 1997. The Complaint was not filed within six years of that date and they are
barred as a matter of law.
Retherford is equally unhelpful to the analysis required in the case at bar. See,
Appellant's Brief, at p. 13. Retherford brought an action against AT&T, claiming that
her employment had been wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. AT&T
sought and obtained summary judgment on the grounds that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations. On appeal, this Court first identified the rule applicable to that type
of action: "A tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the
claim is actionable." 844 P.2d at 975 (emphasis added). It then applied that rule in the
context of plaintiff s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, recognizing
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that one of the elements of such a claim is "extreme emotional distress." Because this
level of distress does not "so much occur as unfold" the Court concluded that Retherford
did not experience extreme emotional distress and her tort action did not accrue until she
took medical leave from her job upon the advice of her treating psychiatrist. 844 P.2d at
976. Interestingly, the Court did not delay the commencement of the limitations period
for the additional five months that Retherford continued on medical disability before her
employment with AT&T was actually terminated. 844 P.2d at 957. 4
A breach of contract action, unlike one for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, does not unfold; it occurs. In this case that breach occurred, if at all,
on December 9, 1997 when Clarke was given written notice that his contract was
terminated and marched unceremoniously out of the office. At that moment, "all the
actionable elements on the cause of action [were] complete and present." See,
Appellant's Brief, at p. 14. Likewise, the delivery of the Notice of Termination was the

4

Clarke's reliance on the negligent employment section of the Retherford decision is also
misplaced. The Court applied the same limitations period to that claim only because AT&T "did
not advance the argument before this court or the trial court," that the negligent employment
claim accrued before the separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
844 P.2d at 977. The Retherford Court acknowledged, however, that "one might argue that the
statute of limitations against the employer for negligent employment should begin to run before
the statute begins to run on the tort by the employee." Id.
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"happening of the last event necessary t o . . . the cause of action." Brigham Young
University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted) (holding that a claim for breach of a construction contract accrues at the time of
completion of the project). Clarke waited over six years from the moment his breach of
employment contract claim became actionable and his claim is barred.
The Colorado Supreme Court used a claim-specific analysis to consider facts
similar to those before this Court in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo.
1992) (en banc). Lorenz sued Martin Marietta claiming that he had been discharged in
violation of public policy. One of the issues on appeal was whether the claim was barred
by the statute of limitations. The determination of the matter was governed by whether
the limitations period commenced when Lorenz was notified that he would be laid off on
July 22, 1975 or on his last day of employment on July 25, 1975. To answer that
question, the Colorado Supreme Court first concluded that a claim for wrongful discharge
under the public-policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine "sounds in tort."
823 P.2d at 115. The Matin Marietta Court then relied upon the general rule that "[a]
cause of action in tort does not accrue until there is a concurrence of tortious conduct and
actual injury or damages caused by the tortious conduct." Because Lorenz did not sustain
any damage associated with the tortious conduct until he was actually removed from his
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job, the Court held that the statute of limitations on the tort claim commenced on July 24,
1975 and the action was timely. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court distinguished the
federal cases on the basis that the test for accrual in a tort action was different than
provided by statute, stating:
Clearly, a statutory claim for redressing an unfair employment practice,
which itself may be the basis for legal redress without regard to any ensuing loss
of employment, is analytically distinct from the common law tort of wrongful
discharge, which requires actual injury in the form of loss of employment as
an essential element of the tort. The test for determining the accrual date of the
former is also analytically distinct from the test applicable to the later.
823 P.2d at 116 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
If the Martin Marietta reasoning is applied to the facts of this case the result would
be the opposite. A breach of contract claim, like an action under a federal employment
statute, does not require damage as an element of the claim. The test for determining
accrual is distinct from the test for accrual in a tort action. Because the breach of contract
claim accrues upon breach, the limitations period commences at that time, whether or not
damages have yet been experienced. Clarke waited too long after the breach to file his
action and it is barred.
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D.

This is Not a Case of Anticipatory Breach.

The attempt to couch this action as a case of anticipatory breach should be
rejected. Clarke relies on Kasco Service Corp, v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992), for
his argument that the statute of limitations did not run until fifteen days after he received
the Notice of Termination. See, Appellant's Brief, at pp. 19-21. The defendant in Kasco,
Benson, was an employee of Keene Corporation. Pursuant to a 1982 written employment
contract, Benson was subject to an eighteen-month non-competition clause. In 1988,
Keene merged with Kasco and all of Keene's rights and obligations under the contract
were assigned to Kasco. 831 P.2d at 87. As part of that merger, Kasco sent new
employment contracts to all of Keene's employees, including Benson. The 1988
agreement included a non-competition covenant like the one in the 1982 contract.
Benson refused to sign the 1988 agreement, asserting that the covenant not to compete
was "null and void." Benson continued to work for Kasco until March 1, 1989. Upon
leaving Kasco, Benson immediately started a competing business. Kasco sued and
obtained a preliminary injunction against Benson. The trial court, however, determined
that the eighteen-month period during which Benson could not compete ran from August
of 1988 when he refused to sign the new contract with Kasco. This Court accepted
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Kasco's interlocutory appeal and modified the injunction to run from March 1, 1989
when Benson left Kasco.
In reaching the conclusion that the actual termination date controlled, the Kasco
Court relied upon the express language of the 1982 covenant which stated that the
eighteen-month time frame began to run "after termination." 831 P.2d at 89. The Court
also concluded that:
We need not decide here whether Benson's announcement that he did not
intend to abide by the noncompetition covenant was anticipatory repudiation. It
makes no difference in this case.
831 P.2d at 89. Despite that caveat, Clarke contends that Kasco stands for the
proposition that the Notice of Termination was only an anticipatory breach that gave him
the option of suing immediately or waiting until after the fifteen-day notice period
expired. See, Appellant's Brief, at pp. 21-22. The Kasco decision does not support that
result. Although Benson expressed an opinion in August of 1988 that the covenant not to
compete was unenforceable, he had not yet done anything to breach that covenant. It was
not until after Benson left Kasco, that he started a business in direct competition and
began recruiting accounts from Kasco's customer list. The Kasco Court did not rule on
whether the statements made by Benson rose to the level of an anticipatory breach of the
contract. Rather, the Court concluded that if an anticipatory breach had occurred it would
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give Kasco the right, but not the obligation, to sue immediately. Under the facts of that
case, the Court concluded that the non-compete obligation did not arise until "after
termination" as provided in the 1982 agreement. Thus, there could be no actual breach
until that time and the claim was timely.
In this case, the Notice of Termination manifested more than an intent to breach
the contract sometime in the future. On December 9, 1997, Clarke received written
notification that his employment was terminated. There was nothing anticipatory about
that decision. Indeed, Clarke alleges that "on December 9,1997, without warning, hint
or as much as an admonition, [Living Scriptures] abruptly and illegally terminated
[Clarke's] employment." [R. 1-17, at Tf 66.] Clarke obviously understood that he was
fired on December 9, 1997. Consequently, the breach occurred at that time and the
limitations period commenced. Over six years passed before Clarke initiated this action
and the trial court was correct in holding that it is barred.
E.

Utah Should Not Follow the California Decisions Cited by Clarke.

Clarke correctly states that the California Supreme Court has ruled contrary to the
decision of the trial court. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 16 & 22 9. In Romano v.
Rockwell International, Inc., 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 (Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court
rejected the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Delaware State
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College and instead held that the limitations period commences at the time of actual
termination, whether or not unequivocal notice of the termination is received prior to that
date. 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 26-27. The Romano Court reached this conclusion by treating the
notice of termination as an anticipatory breach. Id. On December 6, 1988, Romano was
notified orally by Collins, his immediate supervisor that the president of the division in
which Romano was employed wanted his employment terminated. Collins presented
Romano the option of taking a one-year teaching position that would allow Romano to
acquire enough "service points" with the company to qualify for early retirement. If
Romano accepted the teaching position, he would be expected to retire from the company
on May 31, 1991, when he had obtained the necessary number of points. Romano did not
begin the teaching position until June 1, 1990 and retired on May 31, 1989. 59
Cal.Rptr.2d at 22. Thus, almost two and one-half years passed between the oral
notification to Romano and when his employment terminated. Under these facts, it is not
surprising that the California Supreme Court concluded that the notice to Romano in
December of 1988 created only an anticipatory breach.
In Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp., 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 (Cal. 1997), the
California Supreme Court applied that same rule to the commencement of the limitations
period in a constructive discharge case. The Court of Appeals in Mullins concluded that
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the plaintiffs action was barred because he was on notice of the intolerable working
conditions before he actually terminated his employment. The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the statute of limitations runs from the date of actual termination in
any action for breach of an employment contract, including claims for constructive
discharge. 63 Cal.Rptr.2d at 643.
The Oregon Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the context of a
constructive discharge case in Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 963 P.2d 678 (Or.
1998). The Stupek Court, however, based its decision on the elements of a wrongful
discharge claim:
A wrongful-discharge claim has two elements: "[T]here must be a discharge, and
that discharge must be 'wrongful.' "Moustachetti v. State of Oregon, 319 Or. 319,
325, 877 P.2d 66 (1994), citing Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512
(1975). The legal injury in a wrongful-discharge claim is the discharge.
Moustachetti, 319 Or. at 325, 877 P.2d 66. Thus there is no claim until the
discharge occurs.
963 P.2d at 681 (emphasis added). Based on that definition, the Stupek Court concluded
that a claim for constructive discharge does not accrue until the employee actually leaves
the employment as a result of the wrongful working conditions. The Court concluded that
"[b]efore leaving the employment, the employee is unable to establish the element of
discharge." 963 P.2d at 682. In the case at bar, the element necessary to establish a claim
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for breach of contract was the breach. On December 9, 1997, all the elements of a breach
of contract action had occurred and the claim had accrued. Thus, neither Mullins nor
Stupek should be controlling here.
The California approach is inconsistent with Utah law on the accrual of a claim for
breach of contract. The breach of an employment contract occurs upon receipt of an
unequivocal notice of termination. This is particularly true in a case like the present
where the last day of employment coincides with the Notice of Termination. At that time,
the employee cannot claim that the breach is merely anticipatory. Clarke was terminated
and removed from the Living Scriptures premises on December 9, 1997. If the
termination constituted a breach of the Agreement, that breach occurred on December 9,
1997.
Furthermore, the California rule would discourage employers from being generous
with their former employees. There are many instances when an employer will terminate
the employment relationship but continue to provide benefits. The courts should
encourage this behavior rather than punishing it by extending the statute of limitations.
The natural result of such a rule will be for employers to terminate the benefits and
employment immediately. As the Third Circuit explained in Bonham, "we would also
view with disfavor a rule that penalizes a company for giving an employee periodic
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severance pay or other extended benefits after the relationship has terminated rather than
severing all ties when the employee is let go." 569 F.2d at 191-92. See also, Naton, 649
F.2d at 695 ("[A] rule focusing on the date of termination of economic benefits might
dissuade an employer from extending benefits to a discharged employee after the
employee had ceased working.").
Finally, Clarke had all the information necessary to file his claim for breach of
contract on December 9, 1997. Yet, he waited over six years to file the Complaint in this
action. In the interim it is almost certain that memories have faded, witnesses have
become unavailable, and Living Scriptures has generally been put in a less advantageous
position in terms of defending against the Complaint. The Utah legislature adopted a
limitations period for breach of a written contract that is six years. See, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-23. That period is one of the longest available for any cause of action. Compare,
§ 78-12-23, with, § § 78-12-10. The legislature also adopted a rule for the
commencement of the limitations period based upon the accrual of the action. See, UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-1. A claim for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach.

See, e.g., S & G, 913 P.2d at 740 ("A contract action ordinarily accrues at the time of the
breach").
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A decision to extend the time for filing a claim for breach of contract more than
six years after the breach would be contrary to the intent of the legislature.
Such a view would clearly undermine the purposes behind statues of limitations.
See, e.g., Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, f 22, 993 P.2d 207
("Statutes of limitations are intended to prevent unfair dilatory litigation
against a defendant and to require that claims be litigated while proper
investigation and preservation of evidence can occur."); Horton v. Goldminer 's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) ("In general, statutes of limitation
are intended to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are advanced
while evidence to rebut them is still fresh.").
Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 449 UT Adv. Rep. 3, f 13, 52 P.3d
1133,1136 (Utah 2002). See also, Hirtler v. Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231-32 (Utah
1977) (finding waiver of statute of limitations in promissory note void as against public
policy). The Hirtler Court noted that limitations periods are designed not just for
individuals, but also for the public good and are "intended to prevent the revival and
enforcement of stale demands; against which it may be difficult to defend, because of
lapse of time, fading memory, and possible loss of documents." Id. Clarke had six full
years after he was fired and marched out the door to bring his claim against Living
Scriptures. He did not file his action before the limitations period expired and it is barred
as a matter of law.
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F.

The Limitations Period Was Not Extended or Tolled.

Finally, Clarke argues that he compiled a list of pending and unfinished business
after he received the Notice of Termination and that this somehow tolled the running of
the statute of limitations. See, Appellant's Brief, at p. 7, % 10 & p. 10. That argument is
without merit. First, there is no evidence to support this assertion. The Complaint does
not contain an allegation about Clarke's behavior after he left Living Scriptures on
December 9, 1997. [R. 1-17.] Furthermore, despite Clarke's reference to an affidavit in
his Opposition brief below, none was ever filed. [Compare, R. 54, with R. 1-85.] Even if
there were competent evidence of Clarke's post-December 9th behavior, it would not
change the result.
In Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1980),
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument. Wilkerson brought an
action against Siegfried Insurance, claiming that she had been terminated in violation of
federal age and sex discrimination statutes. Siegfried obtained a summary judgment
ruling in its favor on the grounds that Wilkerson had not filed a notice of intent to sue
with the Department of Labor within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.
Wilkerson appealed, claiming that although she was advised her employment had been
terminated and she ceased her employment on March 14, 1975, she was actually carried
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on the books as an employee for purposes of benefits until May 16, 1975. She also
claimed that she performed some additional activities on behalf of Siegfried Insurance
after March 14th. The Tenth Circuit rejected Wilkerson's argument, stating:
In the instant case, the affidavits, in our view, clearly establish that Wilkerson was
discharged on March 14, 1975. Under the authorities, the fact that she was kept on
the payroll until May 16, 1975, because of vacation and severance pay rights does
not alter that fact. Nor does the fact that she may have done some incidental
work after March 14,1975, apparently in connection with her leaving, change
the situation. In our view, there is no genuine issue of fact as to when Siegfried
discharged Wilkerson. As indicated, if Wilkerson was discharged on March 14,
1975, it is agreed that none of the notices later filed by Wilkerson was timely filed.
Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment
on the issue in the case.
621 F.2d at 1044-45 (emphasis added). Likewise, even if Clarke could point to some
evidence that he may have done some incidental work after December 9, 1997, apparently
in connection with his leaving, it would not change the situation here. Clarke's
employment was terminated and his association with Living Scriptures ended on
December 9, 1997. If that termination breached Clarke's written Agreement it did so as
of that date. Clarke did not file his breach of contract claim within six years of the breach
and it is barred.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature has determined that the statute of limitations for breach of

written contract is six years. That body has also indicated that the limitations period
begins to run at the time the cause of action accrues. In Utah, a breach of contract action,
unlike one in tort, accrues at the time of the breach, even if damages are not then
ascertainable. By his own admission in the allegations of the Complaint, Clarke was fired
on December 9, 1997. If the termination of his employment was a breach of the written
Agreement with Living Scriptures, that breach occurred on December 9, 1997. By Utah
statute, he had six years from that breach to bring his claim for breach of the Agreement.
Clarke did not file within the statutory time-frame and his action is barred by the
applicable limitations period. The trial court was correct in dismissing the Complaint
and the Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this # day of November, 2004.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
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